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Abstract
Microkernels are a family of operating system kernels characterized by
their small codebase. Due to their small size microkernels provide extra
security and reliability as compared to larger, monolithic kernels. When
combined with a capability-based architecture these benefits are enhanced,
allowing for even greater security through the principle of least privilege.
The seL4 microkernel, written in C and formally verified, takes advantage
of this capability-based architecture.
Formal verification is an incredibly powerful tool—however, its cost is
significant. Rust is a strongly-typed systems programming language that
provides numerous safety advantages over C and C++, completely elimi-
nating large classes of bugs. This makes the Rust programming language a
good candidate for operating system development.
This thesis describes Wayless, a capability-based microkernel heavily in-
spired by seL4. The kernel aims to provide an seL4-compatible application
binary interface (ABI), letting seL4 programs run without modification on
Wayless. Wayless provides some of the same safety benefits as seL4 through
use of the Rust programming language, without going through the process
of formal verification. Development on Wayless is still in its early stages but
progress has been promising: Wayless already implements most of seL4’s
system calls and a portion of seL4’s capability system.
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1 Introduction
Computers are an ever-growing part of our daily lives. This not only in-
cludes desktop and laptop computers, but phones and smart devices. Smart
homes and internet-of-things devices are becoming commonplace. We are
increasingly relying on the cloud and the servers that back it.
The security of every one of these systems is paramount. We can improve
and ensure the security of computing devices by improving the common
foundation these systems share—that of the operating system.
1.1 Operating Systems and Kernels
An operating system is the system that controls all of the basic functionality
of the computer. This includes managing hardware and giving a usable
interface to the computer. An operating system kernel is the core part of
the operating system. The kernel contains the most essential functionality
of the operating system; it has the highest level of privilege, able to control
all parts of the system.
Microkernels are a family of kernels that contain the smallest possible
amount of code in the kernel, greatly increasing the security and reliability
of the operating system. Limiting the amount of code limits the number
of bugs present in the kernel: estimates put the number of bugs introduced
at around 5 or 6 bugs per thousand lines of code [6]. In monolithic kernels
large parts of the operating system run inside the kernel, giving processes
like drivers kernel-level privileges. Counter to this approach, microkernels
run large parts of the system with user-level privileges, limiting the effects
of buggy or malicious drivers. To accomplish this, drivers and user pro-
cesses communicate with each other by sending messages back and forth
using inter-process communication (IPC). This causes microkernels to per-
form significantly more system calls than other kernels: each message passed
requires a system call to send the message and another to receive it. As a re-
sult early microkernels were significantly slower than monolithic kernels [13].
A large amount of work has been devoted to making microkernels fast:
L4 is a prime example of a microkernel that is fast in spite of its heavy
use of IPC [11]. seL4 is a microkernel in the L4 family, inheriting L4’s
fast IPC but expanding on the security mechanisms in the kernel [8]. seL4
is primarily targeted at embedded systems, but supports a wide array of
hardware including both 32-bit and 64-bit x86 architectures. The seL4 mi-
crokernel is notable for its formal verification and proof of correctness of
the kernel [4], and that all system calls are guaranteed to complete within
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a certain amount of time making seL4 a real-time kernel. The real-time
properties of seL4 prevent it from being delayed by nonessential work when
a pilot is making emergency maneuvers or when a driverless car is braking
for a pedestrian.
1.2 Capabilities
One of the largest improvements seL4 has made is building capabilities into
the kernel from the ground up. Capabilities are an access control mecha-
nism, designed to restrict and control access to various resources such as
memory and IO devices [1]. Capabilities allow processes to have the least
privilege necessary to operate, limiting the amount of damage malicious or
faulty components can cause. The principle of least privilege states that pro-
cesses should only have the minimum system access necessary to operate,
as any unnecessary access can let the process interfere with or compromise
other parts of the system [21]. Capabilities are a powerful mechanism to
limit access to system resources. Capabilities not only greatly enhance the
security given by a microkernel, but allow for even more separation between
processes and enable fine-grained resource allocation.
seL4 is a formally verified microkernel targeted at embedded devices [3].
Formal verification means that seL4 has been mathematically verified to
follow a specification: seL4 has been proven to implement the specification
without any bugs. This specification, which provides a mathematical model
of the kernel, provides for the ability to prove additional properties of the
kernel. Formal verification is especially important in the realm of security—
seL4 is guaranteed to follow a specification so a formal security model can
be reliably implemented on top of this specification. seL4 makes use of the
take-grant security model [4]. Unverified kernels using this model do not get
the same level of assurance. If there are defects in the implementation then
the whole model falls apart.
1.3 Rust
Rust is a strongly-typed systems programming language that aims to achieve
the dual goals of memory safety and speed [20]. This is accomplished
through compile-time checks, meaning that all of the cost of this safety
is paid before the software is even run. Rust is a programming language
whose speed is similar to that of C or C++. Rust enforces memory-safety,
which means there is no possible way to overflow a buffer, create a dan-
gling pointer, or cause a memory leak. This is important because it protects
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against large classes of bugs. Rust has a borrow checker that ensures that
references, an abstraction over pointers, are well behaved and ensures that
creating a dangling reference is impossible. In addition to this, the type
system makes code even more reliable as many invalid programs that would
compile in C would fail to pass the Rust type checker.
Memory-safety is a useful tool for writing correct code. However, some-
times you need to work directly with memory or dereference a raw pointer.
This is especially important when interfacing with C code, as it lets you work
with pointers returned from C. Rust has a mode for achieving this, called
unsafe. When in an unsafe block of Rust code most of the same protection is
available—the type checker will still make sure your program is well-typed,
and the borrow checker will make sure you do not borrow any reference you
wouldn’t otherwise be able to. However, you are free to modify memory at
will and to dereference and write to any pointer. This can lead to the same
classes of memory bugs as C: as such unsafe code is discouraged. However,
unsafe code still gets most of the protections of safe code and provides a
useful mechanism for interacting directly with memory and for interfacing
with foreign C code.
1.4 Related Operating Systems
There are a number of notable Rust and microkernel-based operating sys-
tems. Redox OS is a Unix-like operating system built entirely in Rust [19].
Redox is a microkernel-based operating system, but does not have capa-
bilities and uses a different method of message passing than L4 kernels.
Redox is very far along in its development—there is a fully usable graphical
interface. The system in its current state demonstrates the feasibility of
microkernel-based architectures.
Genode is a microkernel framework built in C++ [5]. Genode is capability-
based, and primarily supports static configuration. This is especially use-
ful on embedded devices, where the resources available to processes are
static and unchanging. The capability-based architecture lets processes run
with the least privilege possible, allowing for greater reliability and secu-
rity. While Genode is not written in Rust, it does allow for the ability to
write components of the operating system in Rust and shows the potential
of capability-based security.
Phil Opperman’s Blog OS is another notable Rust operating system, pri-
marily aimed at teaching [16]. Blog OS solely targets the x86-64 architecture
and is a monolithic kernel. Though not a full-fledged operating system, Blog
OS shows that Rust is an effective programming language for introducing
7
and teaching people about operating system development.
1.5 Wayless
Microkernels and capability-based security are a promising way to increase
the security of operating systems and computing in general. Though progress
has been made in formal methods and formal verification, Rust gives some
of the same benefits without most of the development costs associated with
these methods.
Wayless is a capability-based microkernel, written in Rust. Through
Wayless I hope to not only show that Rust is capable of developing use-
ful operating systems, but that it provides significant benefits over C and
is significantly less expensive in terms of time and effort as compared to
formal verification. I hope to show that Rust is a good candidate for the
development of secure operating systems.
2 Design
Wayless is a capability-based microkernel. This kernel targets desktop com-
puters and servers on the x86-64 architecture, with the possibility of future
ports to additional architectures. Wayless draws heavy inspiration from
seL4, the formally verified microkernel that is pushing the bounds of secu-
rity through the use of capabilities. Wayless has been created with the aim
of binary compatibility with seL4.
2.1 Development Language
While Wayless does not make use of formal methods, the use of a strongly-
typed language like Rust provides some of the same guarantees. In addition
properties of the kernel can be checked with tools like proptest. While
this method does not prove that a property of the kernel is guaranteed to
hold, it gives reasonable assurance of properties and is much more powerful
than unit testing. Rust also provides protection against large classes of
errors. This includes buffer overflows and use-after-free bugs, major causes
of bugs in software written in C. For example, Heartbleed [7], the famous
bug in OpenSSL, resulted from a buffer over-read that would not have been
possible in safe Rust code. While this does mean Rust is a better choice of
programming language than C, formal verification gives exactly the same
benefits and more. However, the costs of formal verification are high, at
around $200-400/line of code [17]. Some parts of Wayless are written in
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x86 assembly, but this was kept to a minimum as assembly has no safety
guarantees.
2.2 ABI
The application binary interface to Wayless is designed to replicate the seL4
ABI. This allows for compatibility with seL4 and the existing tools and
programs built for that kernel. The long-term goal is binary compatibility,
the ability to run programs written for seL4, which will let Wayless take
advantage of all of the existing drivers and libraries written for seL4. Com-
patibility will significantly shortening the time required to develop useful
programs that run on the Wayless kernel, and will enable contributions to
the greater seL4 ecosystem.
2.3 Targeted Platforms
While seL4 is targeted at embedded systems that need real-time operating
systems, Wayless is targeted at x86-64 desktops and servers that often do
not care whether the operating system is real-time. Servers are not used in
the same kind of situations as embedded devices, and they typically will not
require an instant response. The kernel can potentially gain speedups over
seL4’s average time because of this, though Wayless is not at the point where
a useful benchmark can happen. Because there is only a single platform
targeted there is the possibility of making platform-specific optimizations.
The single target additionally makes programming and bootstrapping sig-
nificantly easier: targeting multiple architectures makes bootstrapping more
complex and potentially requires separate code for each architecture.
3 Implementation
Wayless supports much of the functionality of seL4. However, implementa-
tion differs markedly from that of seL4. There are features here that might
not make it into the final version of Wayless as they are outside the scope of
a microkernel. The major components of Wayless are covered in this section,
as well as a brief overview of their implementation.
3.1 Development
Wayless was developed using the QEMU emulator [18]. This emulator short-
ens the development cycle of Wayless: it allows Wayless to be executed with-
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out going through the process of transferring the kernel to physical hardware
and physically booting up the system. Wayless takes advantage of QEMU’s
ability to connect the serial port to the standard input and standard output
of a Linux terminal, letting Wayless easily show the user debugging infor-
mation. Additionally, QEMU supports remote debugging, allowing for easy
debugging from the development environment.
3.2 Threads
As Wayless targets the x86-64 architecture it supports the usual x86 virtual
addressing mechanisms. Each thread is represented by a thread control
block (TCB) that resides in the kernel, which includes an address space,
capability tree, and various other information needed to run a thread. In
the future threads will be able to manage this control object through a
capability.
Threads are scheduled using a round-robin scheduler. They can option-
ally yield to allow the scheduling of another thread or, if the thread runs for
long enough, it will be preempted by the scheduler.
3.3 Memory
Wayless needs to be able to manage physical memory to bootstrap the com-
puter and to start a userspace thread. Physical memory is allocated using
a buddy allocator [10] with stacks of 4KB pages, 64KB blocks, 1MB blocks,
and 16MB blocks. Wayless is a Multiboot2 kernel [15], so on startup mem-
ory information is read from the Multiboot2 boot information and added to
these stacks. Wayless’s current allocator places a hard cap on the amount
of physical memory available: up to 4GB of physical memory can be used.
In the future this allocator will be removed. Capabilities representing
unused sections of memory will serve a similar purpose, letting threads use
memory at will from these regions. This type of capability is called an
Untyped capability as portions of it can be used and retyped to other kinds
of capabilities. The control of allocation through capabilities will allow the
application of a formal security model to memory allocation, ensuring that
processes are only allowed to use memory granted to them [2]. Reworking
the allocator will move it out of the kernel and into userspace, increasing
security and giving processes a greater ability to control their own memory
use.
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3.4 Interrupts
Interrupts are given to provide useful debugging information when an ex-
ception occurs. Interrupts are static and threads have no control over them;
in the future these will be configurable as part of the TCB through the as-
sociated capability. To handle bootstrapping there is an interrupt that will
map a page under any faulting address. This allows for Wayless to easily
bootstrap a userspace thread and to increase the kernel’s memory space.
However, this lets any thread use memory without restraint, and provides
no way of freeing memory. Once Untyped capabilities are implemented this
ability to use memory without limit can be removed.
3.5 Capabilities
Capabilities are tokens that represent and restrict access to kernel objects
and hardware devices, as described by Dennis and Van Horn [1]. Kernel ob-
jects in Wayless have associated capabilites. If a userspace process possesses
a capability to a kernel object it can call methods on the object, letting the
process interact with and modify the object given that it has the capability.
This enforces the principle of least privilege—processes are only provided
with capabilities that are absolutely essential to their functionality. Every
process, even drivers, can have access to only a small potion of the hardware
or kernel objects in the system. For example, the audio driver only needs
a capability to an audio device: it should not be allowed to access your
graphics card or any other hardware on the system.
In addition to providing access to kernel objects and hardware, capa-
bilities grant permission to perform message passing. This is an essential
component of microkernels. Only a small portion of the operating system
resides in the kernel: system services, such as drivers, run as individual pro-
cesses. This minimality requires that there is some form of message passing
between processes, to allow userspace processes to communicate with and
use drivers and other services. To send a message to another process a
message is sent to a capability that represents a messaging endpoint. This
messaging endpoint is linked to another endpoint capability in another pro-
cess. Messages can be sent and received between these endpoints.
Capabilities live inside of a directed graph. This structure is functionally
identical to the capability space implemented in seL4 [4] and implements the
same model of security, based off the classical take-grant model described
by Lipton and Snyder [14]. In this take-grant model the directed graph
represents what processes have access to what resources. If a path in the
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graph can be traced from a process to a resource, then the process has
permission to use that resource. Processes with the right capabilities can
modify the graph, changing the permissions given to other processes.
This directed graph of capabilities works much like a directory tree in
a filesystem, and will henceforth be referred to as a capability tree. This
capability tree is a implemented as a guarded page table, as described by
Liedtke [12]. Guards allow for the compact representation of large address
spaces using only a small number of nodes. A guard represents empty entries
in the page table. For example, if the only accessible entries in a guarded
page table are addresses of the form 0x400XXXXX, a guard of 0x400 can be
used. With this guard accesses to empty areas of memory, like 0x50000000,
will immediately fail and will not cause additional lookups. In addition the
effective address space is now only 20 bits instead of the original 32. This
requires less backing page tables and thus less memory.
CNodes, capabilities that represent the nodes of the tree, can contain
many children while all other types of capabilities are at leaves of the tree.
Every thread has a root CNode, letting each process have its own addressable
tree of capabilities. Each CNode has a size, specified when it is created. The
size of the node determines the number of bits used to address its children, so
thus the maximum number of children the CNode can contain is determined
by 2size. In addition to this size, CNodes possess a guard. As explained
above, the guard allows for the creating of compact, efficient address spaces.
The size of this guard, in bits, is specified by the guard size.
3.6 Capability Addressing
Capabilities are accessed with capability addresses. A capability address
is a 64-bit number, similar to a memory address. An address resolves to a
specific capability, starting resolution from the root CNode of the calling
thread. This is a recursive process: first, the initial guard size bits of the
address are checked against the guard of the root CNode. If the guard does
not match then a LookupFailed error is returned. Otherwise, if the guard
matches, then the next size bits of the address are used to select a child node.
If this selected capability is anything but a CNode, or if we’ve resolved all
bits of the address, the process ends. If the process has not ended it repeats
over again. Eventually this recursive process will exit: a capability has been
resolved.
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Figure 1: A possible capability tree
A possible capability tree is shown above. This tree has two CNodes,
root and node1. In addition there are three other capabilities in this tree,
a, b, and c. root has no guard, while node1 has a 3-bit guard of 0x7. Say
that we wanted to access a. There’s no guard on root. This means the
first size bits of the address should be 0, a’s index in root. Because of this
the first four bits of the address should be 0x0, which means the address
0x0000000000000000 will resolve to a. However, because address resolution
stops after the first 4 bits, any address of the form 0x0XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX will
resolve to a.
Now we want to access c. First, we need to get to node1. This means the
first bits of the address should be node1 ’s index in root, meaning the first 4
bits should be 0x1. Now, we want to access c. However, node1 has a guard,
requiring the next 3 bits of the address to be 0x7. After passing the guard
we want to access c, which is at index 1. Combining these two values gives
us the 4-bit number 0xF. Finally, combining the two 4-bit numbers we get
0x1F and the address 0x1F00000000000000, which will correctly resolve to
c. Similarly, any address of the form 0x1FXXXXXXXXXXXXXX will successfully
resolve to c. To then address b, we just change the index of node1 to 0,
giving the address 0x1EXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.
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Description Address Examined Bits Location
Resolution starts from
the root CNode with
the given address
0x1F00000000000000 root
The first 0 bits of the
address are checked
against root ’s guard
0x1F00000000000000 None root
The next 4 bits of the
address are used to select
a child of root
0x1F00000000000000 0x1 root
Index 0x1 of root was
selected, moving us to
node1
0xF00000000000000 node1
The first 3 bits of the
address are checked
against node1 ’s guard
0xF00000000000000 0x7 node1
The guard 0x7 matches,
so the next bit is used to
determine the next index
to move to
0x100000000000000 0x1 node1
Index 0x1 was selected
and we’ve reached c.
Because we’re at a
capability resolution stops
and the remaining bits of
the address are discarded
0x00000000000000 c
Table 1: Resolving the address 0x1F00000000000000
4 Results
Wayless is a functioning kernel with a handful of different types of capabil-
ities. Though a long way off from supporting the full seL4 ABI, the initial
progress is promising: large parts of the kernel have been implemented.
4.1 Performance
Wayless contains 1.5 thousand lines of Rust code, including tests, and 500
lines of assembly. Once compiled the kernel contains 92 kilobytes of code.
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The complete binary is slightly larger, at a size of 208 kilobytes. Some
initial optimizations have been performed to reduce the size of the kernel,
but future work may be possible in this area.
A preliminary benchmark of Wayless system call performance was per-
formed. This benchmark took place in the QEMU emulator without KVM
acceleration enabled. In the benchmark the Send system call was called
1000000 times, repeatedly calling a dummy capability. This benchmark
tests both the system call overhead as well as the overhead associated with
resolving capabilities. The benchmark yielded an average system call time of
13µs. It is not yet possible to do a ping-pong benchmark, a benchmark that
tests the speed of inter-process communication, as message-passing capabil-
ities are not yet implemented. Once these are a part of Wayless it should
be possible to get an authoritative benchmark.
4.2 Rust
Rust proved to be well suited to the task of writing a microkernel. Rust’s
unsafe mode proved useful when working directly with memory and some
of the many Rust libraries usable without the standard library were used to
decrease development time. The usage of unsafe Rust was kept to a mini-
mum. However, wherever inline assembly is used an unsafe block is required.
There are additionally points where unsafe blocks are used to directly mod-
ify memory, which is required when setting up paging and virtual memory,
and when reading in Multiboot2 boot information. Once this information is
read in it is immediately converted to a safe datastructure, minimizing the
usage of unsafe Rust.
The testing functionality in Rust was useful and helped catch quite a few
bugs. Of course there were some trickier bugs: gdb proved useful for finding
and debugging these as gdb has very good Rust support. Rust’s built-in
unit testing was used to test important parts of the kernel, and proptest
was used to verify properties of kernel datastructures. Though this is not
the same as formal verification, it both shows that properties of my kernel
hold and tests critical paths of execution. Rust thus gave Wayless a large
number of benefits over C, in testing and in safety, and carried none of the
cost associated with formal methods.
4.3 seL4 Compatibility
The seL4 ABI had to be reverse engineered to make Wayless ABI compatible.
This was done by reading the seL4 manual, reading the proofs and spec
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associated with seL4, and finally by reading the C source code. This process
went surprisingly well: though the seL4 documentation does not give a lot
of information the combination of everything being both in C code and in
Isabelle proofs made the process easier.
There has been no test of the Wayless ABI as it compares to seL4: there
is no guarantee that the seL4 ABI was correctly reverse engineered. Once
Wayless is more complete it will be possible to test seL4 programs on Wayless
to verify that the ABI was correctly implemented.
No clean-room approach was taken when reverse-engineering seL4, and
as such Wayless is licensed under the GPLv2 to ensure license compatibility.
5 Conclusion
Wayless is an initial implementation of a Rust microkernel. While only a
subset of seL4’s ABI was implemented, Wayless serves as a useful proof-of-
concept Rust operating system. This subset of seL4’s ABI did prove enough
to be able to run userspace programs, and both the system calls that were
implemented and the ability to address and call capabilities were tested.
Rust proved to be a suitable choice of programming language. The memory
safety and testing features included with Rust proved advantageous. Rust’s
ability to use unsafe code was required for the implementation of portions
of the kernel, though this use of unsafe code was kept to a minimum.
It might be possible to formally verify Rust in the near future, as pre-
liminary research has been done in proving the correctness of the standard
library [9]. This would enable the formal verification of Wayless, ensuring
that the kernel holds to the seL4 specification, and is a potential area of
further development and research.
Continuing work on Wayless is planned with the eventual goal of feature-
parity with seL4. It may even be possible to build a fully-featured operating
system based on this kernel. I hope that Wayless shows not only that op-
erating system development in Rust is feasible, but that, when it comes to
the development of operating systems, Rust might even be superior to C.
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Appendix A
Wayless Developer’s Manual
1 Building and Running Wayless
Wayless can be built with the Make build system. The source code is avail-
able on Gitlab at https://gitlab.com/waylon531/wayless/, under the
GPLv2 license. The default build target, called by running make, will com-
pile the kernel and the included dependencies. This builds a copy of seL4 to
generate bindings and to get the right system call numbers, ensuring that
Wayless provides the same interface as seL4.
There are a few extra provided targets. make run will compile Wayless,
then start it up in QEMU. Similarly, make with-kvm will start Wayless in
QEMU but with kvm enabled.
There are both make clean and make distclean targets. clean cleans
up the bindings, object files, and the final Wayless binary, while distclean
cleans up everything including the downloaded copy of seL4. Finally, there
is a make test target that will run the tests provided with Wayless.
1.1 Dependencies
There are some necessary programs and libraries required to build and run
Wayless. These are listed here.
• xargo
• grub
• mtools
• xorriso
• qemu (may be called qemu-system on your machine)
• nasm
• clang
• ninja (ninja-build on ubuntu and debian)
• cmake
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There are also a handful of python libraries required to compile seL4.
Wayless depends upon header files generated by seL4 to ensure binary com-
patibility.
• setuptools
• sel4-deps
1.2 Bootstrapping
Wayless is able to bootstrap and run a simple user program. This happens
through a macro that includes userspace/start, which gets compiled from
userspace/start.asm. You can create your own userspace program by
modifying the Makefile in userspace/Makefile to compile the program of
your choice: this compiled userspace space program must be located at
userspace/start.
This program is given an initial capability space. This space consists of
a root CNode with two slots, and an IOPort capability in the first slot at
index 0. This IOPort capability is for all IO ports on the system, and can be
used to print and read from the serial port. This space, though not enough
to write featured programs, is enough to print to the screen and to show
that capabilities and system calls are working.
2 Structures
2.1 msgInfo
msgInfo is a single 64-bit number, subdivided into 4 sections. The first
section, starting from the least significant bit and consisting of the first 7 bits
of the number, represents the length of the message. The length is measured
in 64-bit words, the initial words get placed into machine registers and the
rest will go into the IPC buffer. The next 2 bits represent the number of
capabilities sent alongside the message, while the following 3 bits represent
which capabilities were unwrapped by the receiver. Finally, the last 52 bits
of the number are a label. The label is used to specify what method to call
on capabilities, but is unmodified by the kernel and can be used for any
purpose when doing IPC. The correspondence between label numbers and
capability methods is described in Section 4.
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Figure 2: msgInfo
3 System Calls
Wayless has the same system calls as seL4. These are documented here. To
call a system call make sure to save rsp, as well as rcx and r11, as these
registers will be clobbered during the process. The system call number
should go in rdx, while rdi is the pointer to the capability you want to
operate on and rsi is the msgInfo. There are also four message registers,
r10, r8, r9, and r15. All system calls happen using the syscall instruction,
as only 64-bit mode is supported.
3.1 Send
Send has a systemcall number of -3, and is used to send a message to a
capability. The first words of the message are passed in the four message
registers, while the rest of the message has to be passed in an IPC buffer.
This system call will block until the message is received.
3.2 NBSend
NBSend has a systemcall number of -8. NBSend is a nonblocking version of
send.
3.3 Recv
Recv has a systemcall number of -5, and will get a message from an endpoint.
The message will be returned into the message registers and IPC buffer of
the current thread, the sender’s badge will be returned in rdi, and the
received msgInfo will be returned in rsi. This is a blocking call and will
wait until a message is received.
3.4 NBRecv
NBRecv has a systemcall number of -8. NBRecv works the same as receive
but will not block.
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3.5 Call
Call has a systemcall number of -1. Call is used to make calls to capabilities,
being functionally identical to a method call. This is the same as doing a
Send and then a Recv. In seL4 Call will additionally give the caller a Reply
capability, which can be used to send a reply to the callee, but this has
not been implemented yet in Wayless. Similar to Recv the response will be
passed as an IPC message, filling up first the message registers and then the
IPC buffer.
3.6 Reply
Reply has a systemcall number of -6. Reply is unimplemented, but once
implemented will be used to send messages via Reply capabilities.
3.7 ReplyRecv
ReplyRecv has a systemcall number of -2. ReplyRecv does a Reply and then
a Recv. This is unimplemented.
3.8 Yield
Yield has a systemcall number of -7. Yield pauses the current thread, letting
the next process start. It takes no arguments.
4 Capabilities
Methods on capabilities can be called by using the Call or Send system calls.
Using Call will let you get values back from the method, while Send will
throw away any return values. Arguments to these methods are passed as
an IPC message; the first four arguments are passed in the message registers,
r10, r8, r9, and r15, and any following arguments are passed in the IPC
buffer. Methods return values in the same way, in message registers or in
the IPC buffer if the result is too long.
4.1 IOPort
IOPort capabilities are used for sending and receiving data over system IO
ports. This is used in the provided userspace program to print to the serial
terminal.
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4.1.1 X86IOPortOut8
X86IOPortOut8 takes an io port as the first argument, and an 8-bit byte to
output to the serial port as the second argument. The label for this method
is 46.
4.1.2 X86IOPortOut16
X86IOPortOut16 takes an io port as the first argument, and a 16-bit word to
output to the serial port as the second argument. The label for this method
is 47.
4.1.3 X86IOPortOut32
X86IOPortOut32 takes an io port as the first argument, and a 32-bit double
word to output to the serial port as the second argument. The label for this
method is 48.
4.1.4 X86IOPortIn8
X86IOPortIn8 takes an io port as the first argument. This will read a 8-bit
byte from the specified IO port, which will be returned in the first message
register. The label for this method is 43.
4.1.5 X86IOPortIn16
X86IOPortIn16 takes an io port as the first argument. This will read a
16-bit word from the specified IO port, which will be returned in the first
message register. The label for this method is 44.
4.1.6 X86IOPortIn32
X86IOPortIn32 takes an io port as the first argument. This will read a 32-
bit double word from the specified IO port, which will be returned in the
first message register. The label for this method is 45.
4.2 CNode
CNodes hold other nodes and work like nodes in the capability tree. Cur-
rently no methods are supported on CNodes.
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